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I.

INTRODUCTION

Relocation cases . . . present some of the knottiest and
most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon
to resolve. In these cases, the interests of a custodial
parent who wishes to move away are pitted against those
of a noncustodial parent who has a powerful desire to
maintain frequent and regular contact with the child.
Moreover, the court must weigh the paramount interests
of the child, which may or may not be in irreconcilable
1
conflict with those of one or both of the parents.
One of the thorniest, most difficult areas in family law involves
the situation where one parent desires to change the child’s
permanent residence to a location a great distance away from the
other parent. Traditionally, these cases have involved an out-ofstate move, but, as practitioners have long known, an in-state move
involving substantial distances can be as traumatic to the family as a
short move to a neighboring state.
Minnesota relocation law, like that of many states, requires a
different analysis depending on whether the relocation in question
is post-decree or in an initial custody determination and whether
the relocation is in-state or out-of-state. In 2006, Minnesota’s longstanding statute governing out-of-state moves was amended,
overruling ingrained case law.
However, no similar statute
specifically addresses in-state moves. Therefore, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals recently attempted to clarify the in-state
relocation issue.
On March 10, 2009, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed
the notion of in-state relocation in an initial custody determination.
2
In Schisel v. Schisel, the court erred by applying a standard without
3
statutory authority, based on archaic social sciences and case law.
Although the Schisel court correctly determines that the bestinterests-of-the-child standard applies, it errs in using an additional
1.
2.
3.

Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996).
762 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
See infra Part III.
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“necessary” standard to determine in-state relocation. In an initial
custody determination involving in-state relocation, only the bestinterests-of-the-child standard should be applied.
Part two of this note provides a review of the precedent prior
4
to Schisel. Part three describes the facts, procedure, and analysis of
5
the Schisel opinion. Part four explains how the Schisel court erred
6
in applying an additional “necessary” standard. Finally, the note
concludes with an analysis of how Schisel should have been decided
7
and the future of in-state relocation cases in Minnesota.
II. MINNESOTA RELOCATION STANDARD
Relocation has been a puzzling and dynamic issue for
Minnesota courts over the years; therefore, a proper understanding
of the present state of the law in this area requires a review of the
precedent. Because little Minnesota case law specifically addresses
the notion of in-state relocation, out-of-state relocation case law
provides the foundation for its analysis.
A.

The Auge Presumption

The most significant case regarding Minnesota relocation law
was decided over two decades ago. In Auge v. Auge, the mother,
who had been awarded sole legal and physical custody, moved the
district court to allow her child to accompany her to Hawaii for
8
part of the year. The trial court denied the motion, partially
because there was no “deep business necessity” for traveling to
9
Hawaii each year. Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court
10
held that the custodial parent had the presumptive right to travel,
and the parent opposing the move had the burden of showing that
removal was not in the best interests of the child and that removal
11
“would endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.” The

4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Conclusion.
8. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1983). For a review of
Minnesota relocation law prior to Auge, see generally Robert E. Oliphant,
Minnesota’s Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is There a Need for Change?, 28 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 723, 730–32 (2001).
9. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 395 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 399.
11. Id. at 395.
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presumptive right to travel was based upon the theory that the
minor child and the custodial parent formed a new family-unit, a
12
theory that predominated at the time. The Auge court stated,
Given the inadequacy of judicial determinations as to the
best interests of the child, and given that one of the few
guidelines we have is the fact that continuity and stability
in relationships are important for the child, courts should
be restricted in their authority to interfere with postdivorce family-unit decision-making. Decisions concerning
the welfare of the child should be left to the custodial
parent who, by virtue of his or her relationship with the
child, is best-equipped to determine the child’s needs.
The custodial parent should be permitted to decide where
13
he or she and the child will reside . . . .
Two years later, in 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
14
addressed the issue of relocation again. In Sefkow v. Sefkow, the
district court granted custody of one child to Ms. Sefkow on the
condition that she remain “in either Fergus Falls or the Fargo15
The Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated
Moorhead area.”
this provision, stating, “[U]nnecessary limits on movement of the
family unit unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a
child. Removal will be prohibited if it is shown that it contradicts
16
the best interests of a child . . . .” In its opinion, the Minnesota
17
Court of Appeals gave “unyielding heed to Auge.” Indeed, courts
predominately applied Sefkow for years stating that in-state
relocation requests at the time of an initial custody determination
were contrary to law and impermissible.
Following Sefkow, a trio of cases further solidified the
prohibition against in-state geographic restrictions. In Bateman v.
Bateman, the trial court granted the custodial mother joint physical
and legal custody of two minor children while requiring her to
12. Oliphant, supra note 8, at 736.
13. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial
Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 363 (1981) (footnote
omitted)).
14. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) remanded on other
grounds, 374 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1985). The Sefkow marital dissolution proceeding
lasted four years with three separate appeals. The Schisel decision relies on the
second Sefkow appeal. See infra Part III.
15. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 46.
16. Id. (citing Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397, 399) (emphasis added). See also
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1988).
17. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 46.
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18

reside in the St. Cloud School District. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that “the trial court’s residential
19
restriction is contrary to law, it is an impermissible limit . . . .”
Again in 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals overturned an
in-state geographic restriction. In Ryan v. Ryan, the trial court
mandated that the custodial mother reside in the city of Aitkin as a
20
condition of her receiving sole physical custody. The appellate
court found this restriction to be “impermissibly restrictive” and
21
“contrary to the presumption favoring removal.”
Finally, in Imdieke v. Imdieke, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
22
once again found an in-state restriction to be impermissible. The
court held, “To base custody or care on a parent’s remaining in a
23
certain area is a restrictive condition contrary to Minnesota law.”
All three cases relied on the new family-unit theory established by
Auge. Additionally, all three cases stood for the proposition that instate geographic restrictions were impermissibly restrictive and
contrary to Minnesota law.
In 2006, the Minnesota legislature replaced the Auge
presumption in favor of removal with the best-interests-of-the-child
standard. On May 31, 2006, the Minnesota legislature passed into
24
law Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3. The statute
18. Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
19. Id. at 251 (citing Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 47).
20. Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
21. Id. (citing Sefkow, 378 N.W.2d at 74; Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240; and Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393).
22. Imdieke v. Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
23. Id. at 244 (citing Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393). Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d
626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), criticizes the proposition stated in Imdieke as
“dictum and without basis in the law.” However, the Imdieke proposition was
effectively overruled, as discussed later. See infra Part IV.A.
24. In 1971, section 518.175, subdivision 3, was enacted to read, “The
custodial parent shall not move the residence of the child to another state except
upon order of the court or with the consent of the noncustodial parent, when the
noncustodial parent has been given visitation rights by the decree.” 1971 Minn.
Laws 352. The section has been amended six times since its enactment. It was first
amended in 1978 by adding the phrase “or more than 100 miles within this state”
after the word “state.” 1978 Minn. Laws 1078–79. A year later, the phrase was
removed. 1979 Minn. Laws 566. The legislature added the sentence “[I]f the
purpose of the move is to interfere with visitation rights given to the noncustodial
parent by the decree, the court shall not permit the child’s residence to be moved
to another state,” to the end of section 518.175. 1982 Minn. Laws 992. In 2000,
the words “visitation rights” were replaced with “parenting time.” 2000 Minn.
Laws 1001. The 2001 amendment further neutralized the reading of section
518.175, subdivision 3, by omitting the words “custodial” and “noncustodial,”
which describe the child’s relationship with each parent, and replacing the words
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amended the standard for a custodial parent moving with a child
from the state of Minnesota. This change represents a significant
departure from prior Minnesota statutory and case law which
presumed that a parent with physical custody would be able to
move the minor child from the state of Minnesota. The new statute
requires the district court to apply a best-interests standard when
considering a request of a parent to move the child’s residence
25
from Minnesota. These best-interests factors, which are not the
same as the best-interests factors used in initial custody
determinations, are contained in section 518.175, subdivision 3,
and pertain specifically to cases in which a parent requests to move
26
The factors, as stated in
a child’s residence to another state.
section 518.175, subdivision 3, are directly related to the
circumstances surrounding the move. Furthermore, the current
statute places the burden of proof directly upon the parent
requesting the move unless that person has been the victim of
domestic abuse, in which case the burden shifts to the non27
relocating parent.
B. The LaChapelle Locale Restriction
As opposed to the Auge presumption favoring removal, a locale
restriction is a grant of custody conditioned upon a custodial
28
A locale
parent remaining in a specific geographic area.
restriction is included in the custody order by judgment or
29
Therefore, the party requesting
stipulation of the parties.
relocation must bring an order for modification of custody, which
has a higher standard for modification, in post-decree relocation
30
requests.

with “with whom the child resides” and “other,” respectively. Additionally, the
2001 amendment replaced the word “when” with “if.” 2001 Minn. Laws 146.
25. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3(b) (2009).
26. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).
27. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3(c) (2009).
28. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
29. In re Marriage of Goldman, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008)
(Goldman II).
30. Id. (stating that “the defining feature of a locale restriction is that it is
included in the custody order and thus cannot be eliminated unless a party meets
the heightened standard for custody order modification under section
518.18(d)”). When making a motion for modification of custody, the moving
party must show endangerment of the child, whereas the best interest of the child
standard applies in initial custody determinations. Id.
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31

In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the
notion of locale restrictions. In LaChapelle v. Mitten, the biological
mother, Mitten, was granted temporary custody and permission to
32
move to Michigan with her child, pending further proceedings.
After trial, the court awarded sole physical custody to Mitten on the
condition that she provide a permanent residence for her child in
33
34
Minnesota. Mitten appealed. The court of appeals held that the
best-interests-of-the-child standard must be applied in initial
35
The court of appeals also
custody determination proceedings.
found that “[i]n an initial custody proceeding, a trial court treats a
proposed change of residence by a party as one factor to balance in
36
determining custody of a child.” The court held that it was in the
best interests of the minor child to live in Minnesota, not Michigan,
37
and affirmed the district court’s conditional custody award.
LaChapelle represented a significant move away from the new
family-unit theory and the Auge presumption by no longer
presuming that a move with the custodial parent was in the child’s
best interests.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of
conditional custody awards and locale restrictions in 2006. In
Dailey v. Chermak, the district court granted the custodial mother
permission to move her minor child from Minnesota to South
38
The initial district court ruling stated, “The [c]ourt’s
Dakota.
ruling on physical custody is conditional upon petitioner
39
remaining in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.” The court of
appeals held, “[T]here is no absolute prohibition under Minnesota
law against awarding child custody on the condition of maintaining
a specific geographic residence for the child, as long as that
residence is shown clearly and genuinely to serve the child’s best
40
interests.” Dailey moved the courts further from the new familyunit theory and the Auge presumption.
In 2007, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the
31. Thirteen years after Imdieke, but six years before section 518.175,
subdivision 3 was amended.
32. LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 157.
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 162.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 630.
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41

applicability of section 518.175, subdivision 3, to relocation cases.
In 2002, Deborah Goldman was awarded sole physical custody of
her son on the condition that she remain in the state of
42
Four years later, she moved the district court to
Minnesota.
43
relocate to New York City. The district court applied Minnesota
Statutes section 518.18(d), which addressed the standard for
modification of custody, as opposed to Minnesota Statutes section
518.175, subdivision 3, because the motion involved changes in a
44
“custody order” or a “custody arrangement.” The district court
denied Goldman’s motion based on a failure to present a prima
45
The Minnesota Court of Appeals
facie case of endangerment.
reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to apply
the best-interests standard outlined in section 518.175, subdivision
46
3. Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held,
Auge established a preference because of the importance
of a child’s relationship with his primary custodial parent
under the scheme of Minnesota’s child custody
statutes . . . And the legislature, although it has modified
the laws to remove a presumption in favor of the
custodian’s proposed removal, it has not altered the
statutory scheme that prompted the Auge court to protect
47
the child’s relationship with the sole custodian.
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the
48
district court’s order. The court determined that a motion for
removal by a sole physical custodian subject to a locale restriction
“falls within the ambit” of section 518.18(d), because the statute
applies to modification of “prior custody orders” or “prior custody
49
Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court
arrangements.”
determined that the district court had properly applied the law and
“the defining feature of a locale restriction is that it is included in
41. In re Marriage of Goldman, 725 N.W.2d 747, 749 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007) (Goldman I).
42. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d at 749.
43. Id. at 750.
44. Id. at 752–53.
45. Id. at 750. In relevant part, MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2009) states, “[T]he
court shall not modify a prior custody order or a parenting plan provision which
specifies the child’s primary residence unless it finds . . . (iv) the child’s present
environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the
child’s emotional development . . . .”
46. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d at 761.
47. Id. at 754–55.
48. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2008).
49. Id. at 283.
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the custody order and thus cannot be eliminated unless a party
meets the heightened standard for custody order modification
50
Further, the court specifically
under section 518.18(d).”
recognized that in circumstances where a custodial parent makes a
motion for removal of the minor child from the jurisdiction, and
where there is no locale restriction in the custody order, section
51
Finally, the Goldman court
518.175, subdivision 3, applies.
expressly rejected the Auge presumption and the new family-unit
theory by stating, “[O]ur ruling in Auge has no remaining vitality
52
because it has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”
III. THE SCHISEL DECISION
While not specifically addressing a LaChapelle locale restriction,
on March 10, 2009, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled on an in53
state relocation request in an initial custody determination.
A. Facts of the Case
On July 21, 2006, Kristine Schisel initiated dissolution
proceedings against her husband, Daniel Schisel, after eleven years
54
of marriage. The couple had two children together, ages six and
55
eight at the time of the dissolution proceeding. Both children
56
lived in Mankato, Minnesota, their entire lives.
Although the family lived in Mankato, Ms. Schisel worked in
57
downtown Minneapolis as a real estate agent. This entailed more
than a three-hour round-trip commute each day, Monday through
58
59
On Fridays, she worked from home.
During the
Thursday.
divorce proceedings, Ms. Schisel was “adamant” that she be allowed
to move the children’s primary residence to Lakeville, Minnesota,
approximately seventy miles north of Mankato, to be closer to her
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 283 n.5 (citations omitted).
53. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment
and Decree at 8, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 17,
2007) [hereinafter Judgment and Decree].
57. Appellant’s Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 7, Schisel v. Schisel, 762
N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (No. A08-0190).
58. Id.
59. Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 6.
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60

family and work.
61
Mr. Schisel worked as a police commander in Mankato. His
schedule required him to work three rotating twelve-hour shifts,
62
The
beginning at either 6:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m., or 6:00 a.m.
different schedules, however, gave him almost two weeks off each
63
In addition, Mr. Schisel was an exempt employee,
month.
allowing him to come and go as necessary, as long as there was not
64
an emergency.
B. Procedural Posture of the Case
At trial, the district court resolved the remaining issues
between the parties, and despite a neutral custody evaluator’s
65
recommendation, denied Ms. Schisel’s request to relocate.
Instead, the district court found that it was in the children’s best
interests to remain in Mankato “because the children [had] been
66
Upon a motion for
ingrained in the Mankato community.”
reconsideration, the court amended its findings and conclusions,
providing that it was in the children’s best interests to reside within
67
Independent School District 77, the Mankato area school district.
68
Ms. Schisel appealed the decision.
C. Issue Raised to Appellate Court
On appeal, Ms. Schisel argued that, although there is statutory
and case law authority for the district court imposing conditions
and restrictions on a child’s residence, there is not comparable
69
authority for in-state conditions and restrictions. She went on to
cite Sefkow for the proposition that “where an in-state relocation
[is] requested at the time of an initial custody determination . . . a
geographical restriction is contrary to law and impermissible, and
60. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 268; Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 10.
61. Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Respondent’s Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 4, Schisel v. Schisel, 762
N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (No. A08-0190).
64. Id.
65. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 271.
66. Id.
67. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and
Judgment and Decree at 3–5, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 18, 2007).
68. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 267.
69. Id. at 268.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/12

10

Niemi et al.: The "Unnecessary" In-state Relocation Standard
4. Niemi.docx

126

1/4/2010 12:39 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

70

requires reversal.”
Ms. Schisel further cited Imdieke, Ryan, and
71
Bateman for the same proposition.
D. Appellate Court’s Analysis
The court of appeals began by rejecting any out-of-state
relocation cases as controlling because out-of-state relocation cases
raise issues and complications that would not exist if the requested
72
relocation was in-state. “Thus, Auge, a case involving a relocation
from Minnesota to Hawaii, does not control an in-state
73
relocation.”
The court of appeals then analyzed Sefkow as precedent on the
74
issue. The court noted that the Sefkow decision “relied on Auge
for the proposition that ‘unnecessary limits on movement of the
family unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a child,’
and held that the ‘residential conditions on the placement of the
75
Sefkow children are unnecessary and unlawful.’” In response to
this proposition, the court of appeals found that
Nothing in Sefkow creates a blanket rule that restrictions
on in-state residence are per se unlawful. Rather, Sefkow
stands for the proposition that such restrictions are
unlawful if they are unnecessary . . . . The later cases on
which appellant relies [Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke] have
cited Sefkow for a proposition that is broader than that for
which the case stands. Had the Sefkow court intended to
create a new rule of law, a categorical prohibition of a
restriction on the intrastate residency of minor children
in a custody award, it would not have used the qualifier
76
“unnecessary.”
After rejecting any blanket prohibition against in-state
relocation restrictions, the court of appeals looked to Minnesota
Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 3(a)(2) (2008), the statute
giving the district court the “authority to restrict a child’s in-state
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court of appeals in Schisel also previously noted that Auge had
been superseded by statute as recognized in Goldman. Id. (“[W]hich cites Auge,
superseded by statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b), (c) (2006), as recognized in
Goldman v. Greenwood.”) (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 268–69.
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id.
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77

residence.” The statute states, “[I]n a dissolution . . . the court
shall make such further order as it deems just and proper
concerning . . . [the minor children’s] physical custody and
78
residence.” The court of appeals went on to explain that “[t]his
authority is modified by the fundamental requirement” of applying
the best-interests-of-the-child standard as codified in Minnesota
79
Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1 (2008). Citing Sefkow, the
court finally states that “if there is to be any restriction on the
children’s residence, the order further requires the restriction be
80
necessary to serve the children’s best interests.” Therefore, the
court of appeals held that “the district court enjoys the authority to
restrict the in-state residence of a minor child upon a showing that
81
the restriction is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.”
E. Appellate Court’s Holding
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found the district court’s
finding that “the children have been ingrained into the Mankato
community” was “insufficient to demonstrate a necessity for a
82
geographical restriction on the children’s primary residence.”
83
The case was remanded for further consideration of the issue.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Schisel court used THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1535 (3rd ed. 1992) to
define “residence” more commonly as a place, or geography, and not with whom
the child is to live. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269–70.
82. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
83. Id. On July 30, 2009, the district court filed an Order on Remand and
Amended Judgment and Decree. Order on Remand and Amended Judgment and
Decree, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 30, 2009). In the
order, the court amended its previous findings of fact in order to show the in-state
geographic restriction was “necessary,” although it “believe[d] the appellate court
may have misconstrued [its] reliance on the fact that the children had been
‘ingrained’ in the [Mankato] community.” Id. at 2, 13. The amended findings of
fact stated that the proposed move would “significantly and negatively” impact the
children’s relationship with Mr. Schisel. Id. at 2. The district court noted that the
parties stipulated to joint physical custody. Id. at 3. Joint physical custody occurs
when “the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is
structured between the parties.” Id. The district court stated that, as a police
commander with rigid shifts, it is “uniquely difficult” to establish a parenting plan
that would give Mr. Schisel “meaningful and frequent interaction with his
children.” Id. His schedule and the proposed move would make “seeing the
children in the evening difficult when an hour or more commute each way is
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IV. THE “NECESSARY” STANDARD
The Schisel court applied the Sefkow “necessary” standard to
determine whether an in-state relocation was in the children’s best
interests. This standard, however, is misplaced. The “necessary”
burden is based upon statutory and case law that had been
overruled due to advancements in social sciences. The “necessary”
standard therefore reverts to the Auge presumption by creating an
additional burden on the custodial parent. Such additional
burdens skew legislative intent and have little bearing on the
suitability of a custodial parent to retain custody.
A. The Sefkow Analysis
As previously discussed, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke stood for
the proposition that in-state geographic restrictions were
84
impermissibly restrictive and contrary to Minnesota law.
Therefore, if these cases were still good law, Ms. Schisel would have
been presumptively allowed to move her children to Lakeville.
However, the Schisel court dismisses these cases as being overly
85
In this dismissal, the court does not overrule or
broad.
distinguish the cases. Instead, the court cites Sefkow for the
proposition that restrictions on children’s residence must be
86
necessary to serve the children’s best interests. This reliance on
necessary.” Id. Additionally, the children’s “relationship with their dad would
change drastically because he would no longer be able to ‘drop in’ at school or
games or transport them places during his work hours.” Id. at 4. However, “if the
children remained in Mankato, they could continue to have daily or near-daily
interaction with their father,” enabling both parents to “effectuate their
agreement for joint physical custody.” Id. at 3–4. The district court also found in
an amended findings of fact regarding child support that “[o]n an annualized
basis, [Mr. Schisel] will have actual custody of the children 25% of the time and
[Mrs. Schisel] will have actual custody of the children 75% of the time.” Id. at 9.
84. See Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(“[T]he trial court’s residential restriction is contrary to law, it is an impermissible
limit.”); Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
trial court’s mandate that mother reside in city of Aitkin “impermissibly
restrictive” and “contrary to the presumption favoring removal”); Imdieke v.
Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“To base custody or care on
a parent’s remaining in a certain area is a restrictive condition contrary to
Minnesota law.”).
85. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269 (“The later cases on which appellant relies
[Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke] have cited Sefkow for a proposition that is broader
than that for which the case stands.”).
86. Id. (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37, 46–47 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985)).
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Sefkow is misplaced, for Sefkow, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke had all
been effectively overruled.
Generally, under the rule of stare decisis, precedent should
87
not be easily overruled. However, this is not an inflexible rule but
88
Decisions, therefore, may be effectively
rather a policy of law.
89
overruled when the conditions in society have changed or “the
statutory or case law on which the decision rests has been altered so
90
that it no longer is sustained by such decision.”
1. Change in Social Science
Originally, Minnesota courts adopted social science theory
favoring the removal of a child. The Auge presumption was based
on social science research which promoted the stability of the new
91
Indeed, the Auge opinion
family-unit in post-divorce families.
recognizes the “importance of stability in the child’s post-divorce
92
The court goes on to state, “[C]ourts
familial relationships.”
should be restricted in their authority to interfere with post-divorce
family-unit decision-making. Decisions concerning the welfare of
the child should be left to the custodial parent who, by virtue of his
or her relationship with the child, is best equipped to determine
93
the child’s needs.”
Over time, advancements in social sciences challenged the new
family-unit theory. One commentator found that the research
upon which the new family-unit theory and the Auge presumption
relied “ignored the substantial literature on attachment and loss as
well as research indicating that children are likely to be better
adjusted when two competent parents are involved in their
children’s lives than when the children are raised by single

87. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 66 N.W.2d 763, 770 (Minn. 1954).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 771.
90. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 264 (Minn. 1956).
91. The Auge opinion cites Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents:
Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 361 n.124 (1981); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8–11 (1979); and
Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265 (Summer 1975). Auge v. Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393, 396 n.3 (Minn. 1983). These law review articles all support the
new family-unit proposition.
92. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396 n.3.
93. Id. at 399 (citing Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents:
Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 363 (1981)).
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94

parents.” The new research has been adopted by courts across
95
the country.
2. Change in Case Law
Minnesota impliedly adopted this new research in LaChapelle.
In LaChapelle, the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed a
96
conditional custody award despite a “lack of statutory authority.”
Instead, the LaChapelle court found that a proposed move in an
initial custody determination must be treated as one factor to be
97
balanced in determining the best interests of the child.
Additionally, the court of appeals in Dailey found “no absolute
prohibition under Minnesota law against awarding child custody on
the condition of maintaining a specific geographic residence for
the child, as long as that residence is shown clearly and genuinely
98
Finally, in Goldman, the
to serve the child’s best interests.”
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Auge “has no remaining
99
vitality because it has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”
This series of case law adopted the new theory favoring a bestinterests analysis free from a presumption favoring the custodial
parent. Therefore, the new family-unit theory and the Auge
presumption were overruled by a change in case law.
3. Change in Statutory Law
Finally, the legislature also adopted this theory. In 2006, the
Minnesota legislature moved away from the new family-unit theory
to the best-interests-of-the-child standard in amending section
100
Prior to 2006, the statute governing
518.175, subdivision 3.
removal implicitly presumed that removal of the child would be
permitted unless the noncustodial parent could show that the move
was not in the child’s best interests and that it would endanger the
101
child’s health and well-being. The Senate Counsel Bill Summary
94. J. Kelly & M. Lamb, Developmental Issues in Relocation Cases Involving Young
Children: When, Whether, and How, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 2 (2003).
95. Oliphant, supra note 8, at 740–45 (noting that Connecticut, Colorado,
and New York have adopted neutral approaches to relocation cases).
96. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
97. Id. at 162.
98. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
99. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 n.5 (Minn. 2008).
100. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).
101. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641(Minn. 1996).
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shows the legislature’s intent to replace the Auge presumption and
the new family-unit theory:
Section 13 (standard for removal of child) amends the
general law governing approval of moving the residence
of a child to another state [Auge presumption and new
family-unit theory]. The court must apply a best-interests
standard when considering the request of a parent with
whom the child resides to move the child’s residence to
another state. Factors that must be considered are
102
specified.
This amendment constitutes a change in circumstances,
contemplated and voted upon by the legislature. Therefore, the
Auge presumption and the new family-unit theory were replaced by
advancements in social science, expressly overruled by Goldman,
and superseded by statute.
Because the Auge presumption and the new family-unit theory
were overruled, all cases that relied on the Auge presumption
favoring removal were effectively overruled as well. Accordingly,
the Sefkow opinion, on which Schisel relies, gives “unyielding heed to
103
Auge.” The Sefkow opinion goes on to state, “Auge announces two
major concepts: First, unnecessary limits on movement of the family
104
unit unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a child.”
Additionally, Bateman relies on Sefkow for its proposition
105
Ryan cites Auge, Sefkow, and
against residential restrictions.
106
Finally, Imdieke applies the Auge
Bateman in its decision.
107
presumption as well. Thus, the presumption favoring removal in
Auge, Sefkow, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke was effectively overruled by
108
section 518.175, subdivision 3. Therefore, Schisel, in holding that
“if there is to be any restriction on the children’s residence, the
order further requires the restriction be necessary to serve the
109
children’s best interest,” incorrectly relies on a past precedent
107F

108F

109F

10F

1F

102. Senate Counsel Bill Summary, S.F. 3199, 84th Leg. § 13 (2006), available
at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/billsumm/summary_display
.php?ls=84&session=regular&body=Senate&billtype=SF&billnumber=3199&ss_year
=0.
103. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
104. Id. (citing Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 396–97, 399 (Minn. 1983))
(emphasis added).
105. Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
106. Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
107. Imdieke v. Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
108. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).
109. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
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that is no longer good law.
B. LaChapelle Locale Restrictions
A grant of custody conditional on maintaining a specific
geographic location in an initial custody determination must be
based on the best-interests standard free of any presumptions or
burdens.
A geographic restriction in an initial custody
determination represents the first step to a locale restriction.
Without an initial geographic restriction, a locale restriction could
not exist. Therefore, geographic restrictions in initial custody
determinations are per se permissible. As the court in Goldman
found, “[T]here is no absolute prohibition under Minnesota law
against awarding child custody on the condition of maintaining a
specific geographic residence for the child, as long as that
residence is shown clearly and genuinely to serve the child’s best
110
interests.”
The initial geographic restriction, however, must be based on
the best-interests standard. LaChapelle states,
In an initial custody proceeding, a trial court treats a
proposed change of residence by a party as one factor to
be balance in determining custody of a child. A proposed
change of residence bears directly on several of the bestinterests factors in section 518.17. The factors stressing
stability and continuity of care are of particular
importance in light of a parent’s proposed move to
111
another state.
LaChapelle involved an out-of-state relocation. The Schisel court
rejects any case involving an out-of-state move as controlling
because “[a]n out-of-state move can raise jurisdictional and legal
procedural issues, and logistical concerns, such as the retention of
new counsel in the foreign state, that will not likely arise in
112
However, the Auge court dismissed this argument
Minnesota.”
over two decades earlier. “In the past, removal was commonly
denied because of the potential loss of jurisdiction over custody
issues. This concern has largely been met by adoption in 44 states
110. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008); Dailey v. Chermak, 709
N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
111. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 6, 1985)).
112. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 267.
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of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Further protection
of the rights of both parents is afforded by the Parental Kidnapping
113
Prevention Act of 1980.”
Regardless of the distance or location
of the move, the district court must employ the best-interests
standard free of any additional burdens or presumptions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected the Auge
presumption in relocation cases. In 2007, the court of appeals in
Goldman found that “[t]he 2006 amendment of section 518.175
eliminates the so-called Auge presumption, establishing that the
proponent now must show cause for a removal but that the best
114
interests of the child are to govern the court’s decision.”
However, the court goes on to say that “the legislature, although it
has modified the laws to remove a presumption in favor of the
custodian’s proposed removal, it has not altered the statutory
scheme that prompted the Auge court to protect the child’s
115
relationship with the sole custodian.”
Upon appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to adopt
the court of appeals’ reasoning. Although not the basis for the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s reversal, the court stated, “We note
that our ruling in Auge v. Auge has no remaining vitality because it
116
The Minnesota
has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”
Court of Appeals’ application of the modified Auge presumption
created an additional burden to the non-custodial parent not
intended by the legislature. Similarly, the “necessary” standard
applied by the Schisel court reverts to the Auge presumption by
creating an additional burden on the custodial parent. The Schisel
court should have treated the proposed move as simply another
117
factor to balance in determining who should have custody.
C. Other Jurisdictions Use of the Necessary Standard
Other jurisdictions have rejected the “necessary” standard. In
1996, the California Supreme Court refused to adopt the
113. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (citation omitted). See generally Russell
M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66
MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982).
114. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
115. Id. at 755.
116. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 n.5 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).
117. See Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that “[t]he court should have treated the proposed move as simply another factor
to balance in determining who should have custody under Minn. Stat. § 518.17
(1982) [as opposed to applying the Auge presumption]”).
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118

“necessary” standard in Burgess v. Burgess.
In Burgess, the mother
and father stipulated that they would share joint legal custody of
119
the children and the mother would retain sole physical custody.
During the initial custody determination, the mother contemplated
a “career advancing” move from Tehachapi, California, the original
120
The move would
primary residence, to Lancaster, California.
take the children approximately 40 minutes (of travel time) from
121
their father.
The district court granted the mother’s relocation request,
122
The
finding the move to be in the children’s best interests.
California Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the order,
holding that the district court must determine whether the move
was “reasonably necessary,” with “the burden of showing such
123
The California
necessity fall[ing] on the moving parent.”
Supreme Court granted review.
The California Supreme Court held,
In an initial custody determination, a parent seeking to
relocate with the minor children bears no burden of
establishing that the move is “necessary.” The trial court
must—and here did—consider, among other factors, the
effects of relocation on the “best interest” of the minor
children, including the health, safety, and welfare of the
children and the nature and amount of contact with both
parents. We discern no statutory basis, however, for
imposing a specific additional burden of persuasion on
either parent to justify a choice of residence as a condition
of custody. . . . More fundamentally, the “necessity” of
relocating frequently has little, if any, substantive bearing
on the suitability of a parent to retain the role of a
124
custodial parent.
118. Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). The Burgess opinion relied
in part on social science posed by psychologist Judith Wallerstein. Her Amica
Curiae Brief first promoted the new family-unit theory. Robert Pasahow, A Critical
Analysis of the First Empirical Research Study on Child Relocation, 19 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW 321, 322–23 (2005). Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have statutes with no presumptions in
favor of or against relocation. David M. Cotter, Relocation of the Custodial Parent: A
State-by-State Survey, 18 NO. 6 DIVORCE LITIG. 89 (2006).
119. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 476.
120. Id. at 477.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 477–78.
124. Id. at 479, 481.
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Also in 1996, the New York Supreme Court failed to
acknowledge the “necessary” standard. In Tropea v. Tropea, two
125
cases with similar facts were combined. In each case, the mother
was granted sole custody of the minor children in the initial
126
Prior to the decision, New York district
custody determination.
courts applied a three-step analysis in relocation motions. The
three-step analysis required looking to the deprivation of the noncustodial parent and a shifting presumption to the custodial parent
127
to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to justify the move.
128
The third step looked to the best interests of the child.
In response to this three-step approach, the New York
Supreme Court found, “The distorting effect of such a mechanical
approach may be amplified where the courts require a showing of
economic necessity or health-related compulsion to establish the
129
requisite ‘exceptional circumstances.’”
The court went on to
hold,
[I]t serves neither the interests of the children nor the
ends of justice to view relocation cases through the prisms
of presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew
the analysis in favor of one outcome or another. Rather,
we hold that, in all cases, the courts should be free to
consider and give appropriate weight to all of the factors
130
that may be relevant to the determination.
Similarly, the “necessary” standard applied by the Schisel court
creates an additional burden on the custodial parent. As the
California Supreme Court noted, the additional “necessity” burden
“has little, if any, substantive bearing on the suitability of a parent
131
As the New York
to retain the role of a custodial parent.”
Supreme Court noted, such presumptions or burdens do not serve
132
Indeed, each
the children’s best interests or the ends of justice.
initial custody determination should be decided based upon the
best-interests-of-the-child standard without an additional
133
“necessary” standard.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 146 (N.Y. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996).
See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
Id.
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Additional burdens or presumptions create confusion and
134
uncertainty. Although the Schisel opinion defines “residence,” it
135
Dailey
creates uncertainty by adding the term “necessary.”
136
Auge mentions an
discusses a medical or educational necessity.
137
Or, as the Schisel court notes in
economic or business necessity.
defining “residence,” “[w]hen no special or technical definition of
a term is provided in a statute, we are to construe the term
138
according to its common meaning and usage.” Not only is there
no statutory basis for the term “necessary,” it is not ever mentioned
139
in section 518.17. Accordingly, The American Heritage Dictionary of
140
the English Language defines necessary as “absolutely essential.”
The mincing of definitions creates confusion and uncertainty for
the district courts.
Therefore, the additional “necessary” burden does not serve
the child’s best interests. The burden does not have any bearing
on the suitability of the custodial parent. The “necessary”
requirement has no statutory basis and fosters confusion and
uncertainty for the district courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Schisel court erred in applying an additional “necessary”
141
standard.
The “necessary” standard is misplaced because it was
based on inappropriate statutory law, case law, and social
142
Additionally, relevant case law dictates that the bestsciences.
interests-of-the-child standard must be applied in relocation cases,
and a potential removal must be viewed as one factor to consider in
143
Finally, other jurisdictions have rejected
determining custody.
the “necessary” standard because it skews the prisms of justice and
134. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 269–70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
135. Id. at 270.
136. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating
that “it is conceivable that a custody award might be properly conditioned on
maintaining a certain residence because of the availability in that location of
special health or educational services that the child particularly needs and that are
not readily or inexpensively obtainable elsewhere”).
137. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395, 400 (Minn. 1983).
138. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269.
139. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009).
140. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1175 (4th
ed. 2000).
141. See supra Part III.
142. See supra Part III.A.1–3.
143. See supra Part I.A–B.
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144

has little bearing on the suitability of a parent to retain custody.
Therefore, the best-interests factors of section 518.17 must be
the only consideration when determining custody and relocation in
145
The “necessary” standard
an initial custody determination.
146
The
creates an additional burden on the custodial parent.
additional burden may prevent a custodial parent from being able
to relocate with his or her child while the same custodial parent
would be permitted to relocate under a best-interests analysis. A
district court may also be inclined to place too much weight on the
alleged “necessity” of the move, essentially allowing a move to
occur that is contrary to the best interests of the child under a
straight-forward best-interests-of-the-child analysis. Despite the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ error in the Schisel decision, the
147
Had the court relied solely
misapplication was not prejudicial.
on section 518.17, it could have found that the district court’s
findings were conclusory and demanded further consideration.
The new “necessary” standard, however, may skew future decisions
148
by creating results not contemplated by the legislature.

144. See supra Part III.C.
145. See supra Part III.
146. See supra Part III.
147. See Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). “The
court should have treated the proposed move as simply another factor to balance
in determining who should have custody under Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (1982).
However, the court’s application of the Auge presumption was not prejudicial in
this case. The record clearly supports the trial court’s decision to award the
mother custody and to permit her to move with the child from the state.” Id.
148. See supra Part III.
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